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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following proposed amendment to the United States
Constitution:
SECTION 1. The U.S. Constitution protects only the rights of
living human beings.
SECTION 2. Corporations and other institutions granted the
privilege to exist shall be subordinate to any and all laws
enacted by citizens and their elected governments.
SECTION 3. Corporations and other for-profit institutions are
prohibited from attempting to influence the outcome of
elections, legislation or government policy through the use of
aggregate resources or by rewarding or repaying employees or
directors to exert such influence.
SECTION 4. Congress shall have power to implement this
article by appropriate legislation.'
* Mr. Johnson is a partner and Ms. Doran is an associate at Davis Wright Tremaine LLP in Seattle,
Washington. Mr. Johnson authored a brief amicus curiae in the United States Supreme Court in Nike,
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003), on behalf of forty media entities and is also the coauthor of
ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH: A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE (2d ed. 2005) with Stephen G.
Brody. None of the opinions discussed herein necessarily reflect the views of Davis Wright Tremaine
LLP or its clients.
1. ReclaimDemocracy.org, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, http://reclaimdemocracy.org/
political reformlproposed constitutional amendments.html (last visited June 17, 2007).
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This proposal may sound like an ill-conceived pipe dream. But a growing
minority of activists and left-wing interest groups has begun a crusade to strip
corporations of their constitutional protections. Indeed, three California
municipalities and at least two Pennsylvania townships have passed resolutions
advocating such an amendment.2 In New Jersey, an assemblyman introduced
legislation that would remove corporations from state and federal constitutional
protection. And at least four state Democratic parties have made this goal part
of their platforms.4 These initiatives, which seek to eliminate the establishment
of so-called "corporate personhood," fly in the face of Supreme Court precedent
that recognizes corporations have constitutional rights against arbitrary
government actions, 5 are citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment, and are thus
entitled to protection under the Bill of Rights.6
Above all, these groups seek to lessen the influence and, quite literally,
voices of corporations in public life. On this theory, companies are profit-
motivated machines with no feelings and thus no stake in social debate; as a
result, communications by their employees and agents should merit no
2. Most notably, the Berkeley City Council passed such a resolution at its June 15, 2004 meeting.
Letter from the Peace and Justice Comm. to the Mayor of Berkeley and Berkeley City Council (June
15,2004), available athttp://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/citycouncil/2004citycouncil/packet/061504/2004-
06-l5%20Item%/o2027a.pdf. In Arcata, California, the city council passed a similar resolution one month
earlier. Press Release, Arcata City Council, Arcata City Council Passes Resolution Against Corporate
Personhood (May 22, 2004), available at http://www.duhc.org/images/ArcataCPResol.doc. The city
council of Point Arena, California also passed a similar resolution in 2000. See Press Release, Point
Arena City Council, Resolution on Corporate Personhood in the City of Point Arena, available at
http://www.mcn.org/e/iii/afd/resolute.htm. In Pennsylvania, several similar ordinances have been
enacted. See, e.g.. Russell P. Kaniuka. Stop Inported Sludge, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 14, 2003, at
A8 (reporting that a western Pennsylvania town had adopted "an ordinance eliminating corporate claims
to civil and Constitutional privileges"); Tom DiStefano, Licking Revokes Corporate Rights, CLARION
NEWS, http://www.celdf.org/news/lickingtownshipreveokescorporaterights/tabid/ 137/default.aspx (last
visited June 16. 2007) (describing an ordinance enacted "'to eliminate the purported constitutional
rights of corporations"').
3. Assem. 3823, 2 10th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2003).
4. DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF WASH., PLATFORM OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF WASHINGTON § 3
(2006). available athttp://www.wa-democrats.org/files/Platform/ 20and / 20Executive%/ 20Summary
20of0 o20the%/ 20Democratic%/o20Party%/ 20of0/o20Washington%/ 20-/2OJ une%/ 203,%/o202006.pdf. For
more information on the stance of the Democratic parties of Oklahoma, New Hampshire, and Maine,
see ReclaimDemocracy.org, Oklahoma Democratic Party Opposes Corporate Welfare, Personhood,
http://reclaimdemocracy.org/ personhood/ oklahoma democrats oppose corporate rights.html (last
visited June 16, 2007): ReclaimDemocracy.org, New Hampshire Democrats Oppose "Corporate
Constitutional Rights," http://reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/new hampshire democratic oppose
corporate rights.html (last visited June 16, 2007); Maine Democratic Party, 2006 MDP Platform,
http://www.mainedems.org/about/platform-rules.aspx (last visited June 16. 2007).
5. E.g., Trs. ofDartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518. 651-52, 654 (1819) (recognizing that
a corporation can invoke the Contract Clause of the Constitution against a states attempt to impair a
corporate charter).
6. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). "The court does not wish to hear
argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which forbids a State to deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies
to these corporations. We are of the opinion that it does." Id. at 396 (quoting, in the statement of facts
preceding the Court's opinion. Justice Field during oral argument).
[Vol. 58:855
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protection under the First Amendment. Marc Kasky and his supporters made
precisely this argument in a landmark case before the California Supreme
Court.7 Kasky sought to limit the speech rights of Nike after the latter responded
to a series of highly publicized reports on allegedly poor working conditions of
its overseas workers using advertisements, letters, and press releases.8 In finding
for Kasky, the court developed a novel commercial speech test which vastly
expands the definition of commercial speech to limit the protections of the First
Amendment for any speech and publication attributed to businesses.9
In this Essay, we suggest this new standard, apparently prompted by an
inordinate fear of commerce and trade, would allow content-based regulation of
corporate speech, which necessarily results in the treatment of corporations as
second-class citizens and the elimination of important First Amendment
protections. In doing so, the ruling in Kasky and the activist groups that pushed
for it have ignored the historic role of corporations, the range of corporations in
existence, and the value of corporations in promoting the commercial, consumer,
and other valuable societal interests that are at the core of American life today.
Part 1I describes the Kasky decision, the standard the California Supreme Court
invented, and its implications for corporate speech. Part ITT argues against the
distinction between individuals and corporations under First Amendment speech
doctrine. Part IV briefly examines traditional arguments levied in opposition to
such rights, considering the specific case of for-profit corporations and
arguments relating to redistributive justice.
I1. THE KASKY STANDARD
At the time of Kasky, Nike-a leading producer of athletic shoes and
apparel-manufactured most of its products in China, Vietnam, and Indonesia. l"
Nike discovered early, as did a few other large American companies, that
outsourcing physical labor to Southeast Asia was a cheaper alternative to
making products in the United States. 1 But, politically, the move was risky,
given the relatively lax and under-enforced labor laws in these countries. 2
In the mid-1990s, American labor groups, and eventually the press, took
note. In October 1996, the CBS news program 48 Hours broadcast a story
suggesting that Nike did not pay its workers the required minimum wage,
mandated overtime, and subjected its mainly female worker population to
7. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003), cert.
dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
8. See id at 248 49.
9. Id. at 256.
10. Id. at 247.
11. See Richard Locke, Fei Qin & Alberto Brause. Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards?
Lessons from Nike 8 9 (Sloan Sch. of Mgmt. Mass. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No. 24, 2006),
available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper 24 locke.pdf.
12. See id. at 11.
2007]
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physical, verbal, and sexual abuse. 13 Other major news outlets produced similar
stories."
In response, Nike launched a campaign to combat what it considered false
allegations through advertisements, press releases, editorial pieces in
newspapers, and letters to university presidents, the latter of whom constituted a
major consumer base for the company.15 The company not only denied these
allegations but also asserted that it paid workers "on average double the
applicable local minimum wage" and gave them free meals and health care. 6
The media took Nike's claims with a healthy dose of skepticism, investigating
each and pointing out its potentially misleading nature."
Marc Kasky, an anti-trade activist, brought suit under California's unfair
business practices law, alleging Nike had distributed false and misleading
statements.8 The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, reasoning that the speech was
not commercial, and thus, could not be the subject of a lawsuit under this
statute. 9 A California appellate court affirmed the decision.20 But in May 2002,
by a 4 3 vote, the California Supreme Court reversed the ruling and in doing so,
announced a new and extraordinarily broad definition of commercial speech to
be applied "when a court must decide whether particular speech may be
subjected to laws aimed at preventing false advertising or other forms of
commercial deception.",21 The three-part test for determining whether speech is
commercial examines the speaker, intended audience, and content of the
message.22
Under the first prong of the test, a plaintiff must show the speaker was
"someone engaged in commerce-that is, generally, the production, distribution,
or sale of goods or services or someone acting on behalf of a person so
engaged. 23 Under the second prong, a plaintiff must show the audience is
13. 48 Hours: Just Doing It (CBS television broadcast Oct. 17, 1996), transcript available at
http://www.saigon.com/-nike/48hrfint.htm.
14. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. For example, Business Week noted that Nike's workers in Indonesia earned twice the
minimum wage only because they must work overtime. Mark L. Clifford, Michael Shari & Linda
Himelstein, 'On the Inside, It's Hell': Despite Improvements, Nike Workers Face Tough Conditions,
Bus. WK., July 29, 1996, at 46. The San Francisco Examiner noted that Nike lobbied to keep the
minimum wage below subsistence level in the countries where it manufactured goods. Stephanie Salter.
Editorial, Decent Wagesfor Nike Workers? Just Do It, S.F. EXAMINER, Jun. 27. 1996. at A19. available
athttp://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/e/a/ 1996/06/27/EDITORIAL I 2782.dtl. In another article the
San Francisco Chronicle reported that rather than giving its workers free meals, a factory in Indonesia
was deducting the cost of such meals from paychecks. Julia Angwin, The Tired Soles Behind Nike
Soles: Indonesian Worker Tells of Suffering, S.F. CHRON., July 26, 1996, at B3.
18. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247.
19. See id. at 248-49.
20. Id. at 249.





South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss4/10
DEFENDING CORPORATE SPEECH RIGHTS
"likely to be actual or potential buyers or customers of the speaker's goods or
services, or persons acting for actual or potential buyers or customers, or persons
(such as reporters or reviewers) likely to repeat the message to or otherwise
influence actual or potential buyers or customers. '24 Under the third prong,
speech must "consist[] of representations of fact about the business operations,
products, or services of the speaker (or the individual or company that the
speaker represents), made for the purpose of promoting sales of, or other
commercial transactions in, the speaker's products or services. '25 Although the
United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider the constitutionality
of the test, granting certiorari, it subsequently dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted.26
The California Supreme Court's new "commercial speech" standard was, in
effect, a decision about corporate speech. The test sweeps within its ambit
almost any statements by any corporate speaker or entity involving any public
controversy that touches upon the corporation's practices and policies.
27
Moreover, by singling out statements likely to be reported by the media, the
court, in effect, ruled that the more public and more newsworthy the
controversy, the more likely it would deem the speech about the controversy
"commercial" and not entitled to full First Amendment protections. The third
prong of the test does little to limit this breadth, for a plaintiff need merely
allege that a corporation's ultimate purpose is to promote sales something that
will almost always be partially the case.
111. CORPORATIONS AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS
The Kasky standard butts heads, then, with well-established Supreme Court
precedent that corporations are entitled to free speech rights on political issues in
which they have an economic interest.29 More importantly, however, the result in
Kasky the degradation of nearly all corporate speech and the calls for
limiting corporate speech are ill-considered when examining the role of
corporations. Historically, companies, as entities set up on behalf of
shareholding individuals seeking to do business in a limited-liability format,
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky. 539 U.S. 654. 655 (2003) (per curiam).
27. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brown noted that the majority's commercial speech test
"taken to its logical conclusion, renders all corporate speech commercial speech." Kasky, 45 P.3d at 272
(Brown, J., dissenting).
28. See id. at 256 (majority opinion).
29. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 77, 784 86 (1978). In addition,
notwithstanding the Kasky court's effort to expand the definition of commercial speech to encompass
corporate speech, the category is very narrow and generally involves "speech which does 'no more than
propose a commercial transaction."' See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)) (holding speech proposing a commercial transaction does receive
some First Amendment protection).
2007]
5
Johnson and Doran: Amendment XXVIII? Defending Corporate Speech Rights
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
have served the interests of government and people. Moreover, establishing a
corporation, especially in the age of the Internet, is an easy task because the
corporate form is accessible to virtually anyone. In addition, the Kasky theory
neglects to consider the wide range of corporations that have little or no greed
motive, such as charitable organizations, advocacy groups, schools, colleges,
universities, museums, libraries, and theaters.
The roots of incorporation are not ignoble. The first corporations in Europe,
for example, generally existed to help non-profit organizations build charitable
and cultural institutions.3 ° America was created by corporations, beginning with
the first English joint-stock company, the Muscovy Company chartered in 1554,
and then the settlements created by the Virginia Company, the Plymouth
Company, the Massachusetts Bay Company, 31 the Dorchester Company, 32 and
the Dutch East Indies Company (which created New York City), 33 to the
Hudson's Bay Company 34 and the North West Company, which explored and
developed the new continent.35 In fact, the oldest corporation in the Western
Hemisphere governs one of the country's most venerable educational
institutions Harvard University.36 At the time of Harvard's incorporation in
1650, 37 corporations were merely a way for the government to form a separate
entity to pursue a specific endeavor. Over time, incorporation also became the
best way for groups of individuals seeking to achieve a specific goal to shield
themselves from personal liability they might incur along the way; without the
corporate form, many of these groups would not have survived. Furthermore,
today virtually anyone can create a corporation with very little cost.
38
Thus, corporations are merely collections of individuals. 9 Corporations are
30. See A Short History of Corporations, NEW INTERNATIONALIST. July 2002.
31. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of
Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 111 20 (2004) (discussing the origins of the various companies
which colonized and established trade in America).
32. GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM SETTLEMENT To REVOLUTION, 1584-1776, at
46 (Clarence L. Ver Steeg & Richard Hofstadter eds., 1969).
33. WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT, A POPULAR HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 358 (1888).
34. Gevurtz, supra note 31, at 117.
35. See H. Robert Baker, Article, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 209, 213-14 (1999).
36. "President and Fellows of Harvard College" is the actual name of the corporation chartered
by the Massachusetts Bay Colony, Harvard University, The Harvard Guide: The Early History of
Harvard University. http://www.hno.harvard.edu/guide/intro/index.html (last visited June 17. 2007),
which was itself interestingly also a corporation chartered by King Charles I that transformed itself into
a colony and later a state.
37. Id.
38. In Washington State, for example. the filing fee for limited liability companies, limited
partnerships, limited liability partnerships, and for-profit corporations is $175: for non-profit
organizations that figure drops to $30. WASH. SEC Y OF STATE, REGISTRATION FEE SCHEDULE (2007),
available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/corps/registration fee schedule.aspx.
39. Of course, the inherent nature of a business enterprise, as a collective entity, may preclude
equating corporations completely with individuals in evaluating the rights and powers they can claim
or exercise. Many privacy protections, for example, are not extended to corporations. See Fleck &
Assocs., Inc. v. Phoenix, 471 F.3d 100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing First Nat'I Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978)).
[Vol. 58:855
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not robots. Corporations themselves do not "speak"; they do not "say" anything.
That is, the adage "guns don't kill people, people kill people" is analogous:
corporations do not talk, people-who also happen to be company agents and
employees-talk. Under the California system, these speakers would also be
denied their rights simply because their viewpoints coincide with or are being
promoted by their employers, or because they happen to have access to a
corporate soap box.4 °
An examination of the wide variety of groups that are incorporated in the
United States today underscores the benefits of the corporate form. Colleges and
universities are merely one example. Consider the innumerable non-profit
charities in existence: the YMCA, the United Way, and the Salvation Army.
Numerous cultural organizations also exist: the Smithsonian Institution, the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Nature Conservancy, the New York Public
Library, the Art Institute of Chicago, the Wildlife Conservation Society, and
National Public Radio. Corporate organizations in the medical field include the
Mayo Foundation, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, the American
Heart Association, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, and the American Lung
Association. Other groups seek to serve youth: the Boy Scouts of America, Big
Brothers Big Sisters of America, the United Negro College Fund, and the Make-
A-Wish Foundation of America. Finally, consider also the many groups seeking
to uphold civil rights themselves: the American Civil Liberties Union, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, and People for the American Way.
Most of these groups thrive on their ability to deliver particular messages to
a large group of people. Moreover, in doing so, they are obviously engaging in
corporate speech and likely meet the Kasky test for commercial speech. As
corporate entities, they are "engaged in commerce." They likely also sell goods
and services that their audience may wish to buy. Finally, they engage in speech
that, while intended to educate and inform generally, also by its very nature
promotes their goals, and thus these products. Elimination of First Amendment
rights in these corporate settings makes no sense, for stifling the speech of these
types of groups would hinder progress in areas like the arts, medicine, charities,
and even civil rights.4
Even more paradoxically, the rule advanced by these activists (and adopted,
in part, in Kasky) would apply to the American media, eliminating the likes of
the New York Times Company and the Washington Post Company from the full
protections of free speech simply because of the accident of their incorporations.
40. For a competing view, see C. Edwin Baker. Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The
Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2004) (arguing against
affording free speech protections to corporate speech because "when claims are made on behalf of
commercial entities, the conflict involves people's creations claiming rights over their creators").
41. In addition to the non-profit groups listed above, Reclaimdemocracy.org, the proponent of the
constitutional amendment set out above and a chief supporter of Kasky as author of an amicus brief,
is also a non-profit organization. The rules it seeks thus limit not only the rights of these charitable,
cultural, and medical organizations, but also its own rights.
2007]
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This disregards Supreme Court precedent, which makes clear that the First
Amendment grants the media full speech rights, even though in the United
States most of the media are commercial.42
Yet, this strange logic, which denies a media entity the usual First
Amendment protections merely because of its status as a commercial entity with
commercial activities, has already been embraced by at least one court. In Doe v.
TCI Cablevision,43 the Missouri Supreme Court issued an en banc decision
finding that the First Amendment did not protect the rights of a comic book
company to create a character based on former National Hockey League player
Anthony Twist.44 In finding that Twist had presented a cognizable right-of-
publicity claim, the court found the speech to be predominantly commercial in
nature, relying on the comic book company's stipulation that the use was neither
a parody nor a fictionalized account of the real Twist 45 (the fictional character
was part of the Mob)46 :
[T]he metaphorical reference to Twist, though a literary device,
has very little literary value compared to its commercial value.
On the record here, the use and identity of Twist's name has
become predominantly a ploy to sell comic books and related
products rather than an artistic or literary expression, and under
these circumstances, free speech must give way to the right of
publicity.
47
A jury subsequently awarded Twist $15 million in damages.48
The TCI Cablevision case, which is flatly at odds with another comic book
42. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) ("That the Times was paid
for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and
books are sold. Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying 'editorial
advertisements' of this type, and so might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of
information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities-who wish
to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press.") (citing Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959)). In addition, denying a corporate media entity the right to enter
into the traditional commercial transactions that allow it to stay in business itself violates the First
Amendment. See Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96. 101 (3rd Cir. 2004).
Indeed, one may ask how the American press could develop and grow to be strong enough to resist
and oppose government power if only the unemployed are allowed full freedom of expression. As
access to the public and private financial markets is denied, everyone owning the enterprise must face
unlimited personal liability, and the government is in charge of ensuring that speakers are denied the
protections of shareholders.
43. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, McFarlane v. Twist, 540 U.S. 1106
(2004).
44. See id. at 374.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 367.
47. Id. at 374.
48. Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
[Vol. 58:855
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case from California,49 may well end up in the United States Supreme Court. The
right of artists to create work has long been protected by the law. For example,
in a recent case involving a piece of art depicting Tiger Woods (exploited
commercially by the artist, who sold copies to the public), the Sixth Circuit
stated that "[t]he fact that expressive materials are sold does not diminish the
degree of protection to which they are entitled under the First Amendment. ' °
More importantly, comic book companies, like other members of the media,
should be fully protected by the clear language of the First Amendment.5 The
press lies at the heart of speech protections, as evidenced by a long line of
Supreme Court cases and the clear intent of the Constitution's framers.5 2
Moreover, limiting the rights of the press to unemployed individuals, and not
protecting the institutional media and their employees, simply does not make
sense. Surely the First Amendment does not offer more protection to an
unsuccessful corset-maker-turned-pamphleteer (Thomas Paine, the author of
Common Sense in 1776), 53 than it does James Risen, the New York Times
reporter who investigated and disclosed the secret scheme by President George
W. Bush and his officials to violate Americans' rights under the United States
Constitution and defy the express requirements of a 1978 federal statute, merely
because he was writing as an employee of a corporation.54
Perhaps an anti-corporate activist would exempt the media from a ban on
corporate speech. Other scholars have advocated special treatment for the
press,5" and the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the possibility.56 Since
1974, in the wake of President Richard Nixon's resignation following the
49. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 80 (Cal. 2003) (holding that comic books are
"entitled to First Amendment protection").
50. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 925 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing City of Lakewood
v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 (1988)).
51. In the late 1950s and early 1960s. a series of cases overturned state laws regulating the sale
of comics. See, e.g., Katzev v. County of L.A., 341 P.2d 310. 317-18 (Cal. 1959); Police Comm'r v.
Siegel Enters., Inc., 162 A.2d 727, 729 30, 734 35 (Md. 1960); Adams v. Hinkle, 322 P.2d 844, 850,
852 (Wash. 1958).
52. See, e.g.. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (noting that the
First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and of free press "share the common core purpose of
assuring freedom of communication"); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)
("Both the history and language ofthe First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free
to publish news, whatever the source. without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints.").
53. See DAVID FREEMAN HAWKE, PAINE 11. 16-17, 44 (1st ed. 1974).
54. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; see also Amer. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754,
758 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (discussing the interception, without a warrant, of international communications
that President Bush authorized in a secret order).
55. See Baker, supra note 40, at 117 1.
56. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) ("The Act's definition
of'expenditure,' § 169.206, conceivably could be interpreted to encompass election-related news stories
and editorials. The Act's restriction on independent expenditures therefore might discourage
incorporated news broadcasters or publishers from serving their crucial societal role. The media
exception ensures that the Act does not hinder or prevent the institutional press from reporting on, and
publishing editorials about. newsworthy events.").
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Watergate scandals, when Justice Potter Stewart suggested in a famous speech at
Yale Law School that the Press Clause had independent viability in addition to
the Speech Clause,5 the United States Supreme Court has retreated from
recognition of any independent press rights.5 8 Nonetheless, the task of defining
the media is an ever-growing nightmare as evidenced by the numerous struggles
across the nation in drafting a reporter's privilege law59; a chief concern in these
negotiations has been the difficulty in deciding who is a member of the news
media, and as a result, what constitutes news.60 In Branzburg v. Hayes,6 the
Court acknowledged this difficulty.62 Justice White, writing for the Court,
declined to find a constitutional privilege for a reporter to keep his sources
confidential before a federal grand jury proceeding:
Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories
of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a questionable
procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the
press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon
paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large
metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition
methods.63
Although some scholars have argued this to be merely a "red herring" in the
debate over corporate speech rights,64 this fear is real, as evidenced by a recent
episode in campaign finance law. The McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance
Reform Act 65 prohibits interest groups from using soft money to air television
and radio advertisements less than a month before a primary or two months
before a general election.66 But it also contains an exemption for "a
communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed
through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are
57. See Potter Stewart, Assoc. Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Address at the Yale
Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation: Or of the Press (Nov. 2, 1974), in 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631,
633-34 (1975).
58. See, e.g.. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) ("[E]nforcement of such
general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement
against other persons or organizations.").
59. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter's Privilege. 91 MINN. L. REV.
515, 518 (2007).
60. See id. at 518 19; see also O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 99 105 (2006)
(discussing the numerous problems the Internet creates in interpreting the scope and applicability of a
reporter's privilege law).
61. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
62. See id. at 703 05.
63. Id. at 704.
64. Baker, supra note 40. at 1170 n.42.
65. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform Act),
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431).
66. 2 U.S.C. § 434(t)(3)(A) (Supp. 2005); see James Dao, Gun Group's Radio Show Tests Limits
on Advocacy: N.R.A. Says It Is Joining the News Media, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2004, at A 14.
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owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate. ' 6
The National Rifle Association, in an effort to meet the media exemption, began
broadcasting a daily radio program "to provide news and pro-gun commentary"
on satellite radio.68 As the group's executive vice president noted, "'[t]here is no
government licensing of journalists. Tom Paine was free to pamphlet. So are
we. -69
IV. THE WEALTH FACTOR AND OTHER COUNTERARGUMENTS
Perhaps these anti-corporate activists instead would seek to exempt non-
profit organizations from any corporate speech ban. After all, neither charities
nor advocacy groups are filling the coffers of wealthy causes; instead, according
to ReclaimDemocracy.org, the Wal-Marts of the world fit this category.7 ° On
this note, the group is not alone, falling in line with a host of scholars who favor
tighter regulation of corporate speech as a form of redistributive justice. For
example, Yale Law School professor Owen Fiss argues that "gross inequalities
of social and economic power lurk behind the seemingly neutral facade of
traditional [First Amendment] doctrine.",71 Under this approach, by placing the
thumb of government on the scales of justice to limit free speech by companies
and commercial interests, liberals can advance the views of their supporters at
the expense of more powerful, and presumably better-funded, business groups.
Similarly, scholar Cass Sunstein has proposed that the government intervene to
restrict mere marketplace freedom of speech and instead promote democratic
values and "considered debate" among its citizens. 72
This type of argument improperly focuses on the identity as opposed to
the purpose-of the speaker. As the court noted in First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union, or individual, 73 but rather "affording the public
access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.",
7
1
But, as John F. Kennedy once said, "Life is unfair.",7' Even if we disregard
the fact that not all of us are eloquent or articulate or have an interesting point to
67. 2 U.S.C. 434(t)(3)(B)(1) (Supp. 2005); accord2 U.S.C. 431 (9)(B)(I) (2000) (excluding media
outlets from the definition of "expenditure").
68. Dao, supra note 66.
69. Id.
70. ReclaimDemocracy.org, Articles, Studies, and Research on Walmart,
http://reclaimdemocracy.org/walmart! (last visited June 17, 2007) ("Wal-mart is perhaps the most
visible symptom of the disease-runaway corporate power-that [ReclaimDemocracy.org] work[s] to
cure .... ).
71. Owen Fiss, Speech and Power: Is First Amendment Absolutism Obsolete? (pt. 3), THE
NATION, July 21, 1997, at 11, 14.
72. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 73 (2d ed. 1995).
73. 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
74. Id. at 783.
75. President's News Conf. of Mar. 21, 1962, 107 PUB. PAPERS 254, 259.
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make, the ability to obtain access to the media and the public is a skill or piece
of luck that is not distributed equally among all citizens.76 Thus, the same
distortion argument could be made about celebrities, who routinely set the tone
of national debate on important political issues. In 2005, for example, Time
Magazine named Bono, lead singer of the band U2, one of its Persons of the
Year, alongside Bill and Melinda Gates, for his fight against HIV and poverty in
Africa.7 As another example, consider Michael J. Fox, whose highly-publicized
struggle with Parkinson's Disease led him to endorse a Senate candidate
supporting embryonic stem cell research in a controversial campaign
advertisement.78
Furthermore, for-profit corporations can and often do take stances on
matters of public import.79 For example, a book recently chronicled the journey
of twelve black executives who were among the first hired by a major American
business-Pepsi.80 CEO Walter S. Mack hired them to attract black consumers.8
As part of this campaign, Pepsi ran advertisements in black publications
profiling black Americans; Mack's new team became "community role models,"
and their efforts earned Pepsi "a reputation as the 'liberal' soft drink."82
Although Nike did not participate on the "liberal" side of a public debate, it did
76. The Supreme Court has recognized that some speakers will necessarily have more access to
the marketplace because they own the means of communication. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 250 (1974). The rise of the Internet has largely remedied these
inequities whether a big or small company, an individual blogger, or the mainstream
media-everyone has access to the Internet, and everyone is accessible through a Google search.
77. Nancy Gibbs. Persons of the Year, TIME. Dec. 26, 2005/Jan. 2. 2006, at 44-45. Similarly, the
Supreme Court has essentially recognized that the wealthy have a First Amendment right to expend
more for freedom of speech than others. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 (1976) ("The ceiling on
personal expenditures by candidates on their own behalf... imposes a substantial restraint on the ability
of persons to engage in protected First Amendment expression. The candidate, no less than any other
person, has a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and
tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of other candidates." (citation and footnote
omitted)); MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF
DEMOCRACY 36 (2001) ("A candidate for political office, for example, obviously lacks objectivity of
expression; anything the candidate says will, in at least some sense, be uttered with the purpose of
furthering her chances of electoral success. Yet her speech quite correctly is afforded full First
Amendment protection."). Redish goes on to note: "[T]he court rejected equality as applied to
individuals as a rationale for a limitation on expressive expenditures in Buckley v. Valeo and has shown
no inclination to shift from that position." Id. at 105.
78. See Matthew Mosk, Michael J. Fox Records TV Ad for Cardin: Actor Questions Steele '
Stance on Funding for Stem Cell Research, WASH. POST. Oct. 24. 2006. at B1.
79. As Redish makes clear, "it is often impossible to distinguish speech concerning commercial
products and services from speech concerning matters of public importance, for the simple reason that
the two subjects of expression are in no sense mutually exclusive." REDISH, supra note 77, at 19.
80. Nonfiction Reviews, PUBLISHERS WKLY., Dec. 4, 2006 (reviewing STEPHANIE CAPPARELL,
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participate in a debate of public import.83 And Justice Breyer, in dissenting from
the Supreme Court's decision to dismiss the writ of certiorari in Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky, made clear that he would have relied largely upon principles of public
speech in deciding the case.84 Moreover, limiting the ability of corporations to
speak out limits the media's ability to accurately cover the issues.85 This is
important, for "the press not only is effective in ventilating corporate speech and
in unmasking misleading claims regarding issues of public concern, but it also is
a constitutionally preferred means of doing so."86
By ignoring these suggestions, arguments about the distortion of debate also
overlook yet another possibility: corporate speech in fact balances the debate,
and its elimination would allow others to manipulate it.8 7 "Corporate speech,
precisely because of both its power to disseminate widely its message and its
obvious underlying motivating force of economic self-interest, can serve as an
effective check on governmental excess."88 Moreover, corporations have the
resources to gather information and come to conclusions independently.89
Corporate speech is particularly effective and important when the media merely
describes political events, or aligns itself with the government. 90 To curtail
corporate speech rights thus unfairly handicaps the debate; as Justice Chin noted
in Kasky, "[w]hen Nike tries to defend itself from these attacks, the majority
denies it the same First Amendment protection Nike's critics enjoy." 91 Even if a
corporation could speak out on a particular issue, it may, in fear of retribution,
choose not to. For example, after Kasky, "Nike chose not to release its fiscal
year 2002 corporate responsibility report" and decided to limit its participation
in the California public.92
Even if, arguendo, focusing on the identity of the speaker were appropriate,
83. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text. Judge Chin in the Southern District of New
York recently recognized the importance of corporate speech, particularly if it relates to scientific
debate, an area traditionally afforded full First Amendment protection-like political speech. See
Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315.326 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("'The First Amendment
protects public debate on matters of public [concern], including scientific matters.' Courts cannot
inquire into the validity of scientific works, for '[a]ny unnecessary intervention by the courts in the
complex debate and interplay among the scientists that comprises modern science can only distort and
confuse."' (quoting McMillian v. Togus Reg'l Office. Dep't of Veteran Affairs. 294 F. Supp. 2d 305.
316, 317 (E.D.N.Y. 2003))).
84. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 676 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85. Bruce E. H. Johnson & Jeffrey L. Fisher, WhyFormat, Not Content, Is the Key to Identifying
Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1243, 1253 (2004).
86. Id.
87. See Deborah J. La Fetra, Kick It Up a Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commercial
Speech. 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1205. 1206 (2004).
88. Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors: Corporate
Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 262 (1998); see also REDISH,
supra note 77, at 65 ("[C]orporate speech may serve a vital role in checking potential government
excesses.").
89. Id.
90. Id. at 263.
91. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 263 (Cal. 2002) (Chin, J., dissenting).
92. See La Fetra, supra note 87. at 1215.
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this does not render the debate moot. Martin Redish and Howard Wasserman
argue that "corporate use of economic power will inevitably have a social and
political impact beyond the narrow interests of the corporation itself."93
Moreover, these authors assert that corporate interests do not always prevail over
the interests of individuals, citing for this proposition the creation of the New
Deal, "the 'Great Society' programs in the 1960s, the heavy federal regulation of
the tobacco and drug industries, and the modern congressional failure to enact
federal tort reform legislation that would substantially benefit corporate
defendants."94 Finally, Redish and Wasserman reason that "[b]ecause of their
expertise, resources, and incentives, corporations are uniquely suited to provide
the electorate with information that will make it more informed as to many of
the socio-economic issues facing the nation.
9 5
In addition, arguments about the distortion of debate mischaracterize, to
some degree, the nature of corporations themselves. Corporations are
associations of individuals, and these individuals all have full First Amendment
rights. The mere fact that these individuals have chosen to pool their resources to
create an entity that shields them from personal liability should not remove this
protection.96 Their choice to speak through the corporate entity should be seen
not as a drive to influence the debate improperly, but rather to provide a unified
voice that represents the views of a large number of individuals, much like the
activities of political associations. 9'
At their base, most arguments that seek to limit corporate speech rights are
founded, impermissibly, on the content of corporate speech and the self-
interested motivation of corporate speakers. 98  These arguments assume
corporations have nothing to offer the debate. This logic is flawed. Most
speakers, if not all, are self-interested in some way; that a corporation is
economically self-interested should come as no surprise. 99 In fact, individuals
are capable of acknowledging this fact and interpreting information
accordingly; 00 so are the media, as evidenced by the tempering of Nike's
93. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 88, at 247.
94. Id. at 247-48.
95. Id. at 248; accord La Fetra, supra note 87, at 1222 (arguing that not providing corporate
speech full First Amendment protections damages the democratic process).
96. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note 88, at 254 55.
97. See id. at 254.
98. See, e.g., Baker. supra note 40. at 1175-76 (arguing against corporate free speech rights
because the competitive market and enterprise survival are the primary motivation and goal ofcorporate
speakers).
99. Redish & Wasserman. supra note 88. at 269-70. As Redish more fully explains in Money
Talks. "it is likely that most contributions to public debate today are motivated by the desire to further
one personal interest or another. This fact hardly leads to a reduction in their First Amendment
protection. It is unclear, then, why the very same factor should reduce the protection given to
commercial advertising." REDISH, supra note 77, at 36. "[T]here is nothing necessarily immoral or
illegitimate in using expression to further one's personal interests. Any theory of free expression that
selectively reduces protection of self-interested expression is inconsistent with the historical and
philosophical traditions of democracy .... Id. at 91.
100. Id. at 269.
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assertions in news coverage.' 0 ' Between their own faculties and media reports,
Nike customers would have known that the company's responses to Kasky's
allegations were self-motivated not only economically, but politically and
legally as well. °2 Arguments based on a corporation's greed also ignore the full
protection granted by the First Amendment to other speech that many people
properly consider undesirable in its purposes and goals speech motivated by
hate, religious irrationality, party loyalty, ideological rigidity, or by many of the
"isms" that have dominated the last two centuries of public debate.
V. CONCLUSION
In their ground-breaking article on commercial speech, Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski and his former clerk Stuart Banner'0 3 wrote that
"[t]he commercial speech doctrine is the stepchild of first amendment
jurisprudence: Liberals don't much like commercial speech because it's
commercial; conservatives mistrust it because it's speech."'
0 4
The recent attack on corporate speech merely confirms Kozinski and
Banner's warning regarding the dangers from the left. Before the California
Supreme Court decided Kasky v. Nike, Inc., anti-globalization activists had
opposed the speech rights-and more generally, constitutional rights-of
corporations. These activists argued that companies were essentially robots,
without feelings or thoughts, and were not entitled to the benefits of legal
personhood. The court's decision in Kasky only furthered this notion, for in
essence, though it purported to create a new commercial speech standard, in
reality it relegated corporate free speech rights to second-class status. This
approach may satisfy and inspire some of those commentators and scholars who
suggest that corporate wealth corrupts public debate, but it ignores many facets
of the debate over corporate speech rights and the value of corporations in a
market-oriented society.
Corporations, however, are not merely profit-maximizing entities they are
our colleges, schools, churches, theaters, newspapers, charities, research
institutes, and advocacy groups. Moreover, whether for-profit or not-for-profit,
they have the resources to, and often do, take important and valuable stands on
issues of public import. To silence them based merely on the fact that they are
incorporated would eliminate or deter the very speech at the heart of the First
Amendment.
10 1. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
102. See La Fetra, supra note 87. at 1223.
103. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627,
627 (1990)
104. Id. at 652.
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